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STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER oF THE EsTATE oF 
MAm:oN EuGENE HARMSTON, DECEASED. 
ROGERS T. HARMSTRON, 
MARIO·N EUGENE HARMSTON, 
HELENE G. GILLIS AND CARL 
FREDERICK HARMSTON, 
Plaintiffs arixl Appellants, 
vs. 
J. H. CALDER, as the Administrator 
of the Estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston, Deceased, 
Defendant ~and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court, 
1C'.:: if. I~ ~oE&·· ·County, Utah. ~~1 ~  . s . _E. NELSON 
..i'L .. a_ · · ~-· res~dvng.,. 
. • -'! ~ .. .. .. ~ g 
. • J.. ~ .-;-· ~-
R. J. HOGAN, 
Attorney for .Appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE EsTATE oF 
MARION EuGENE HARMSTON, DEcEASED. 
ROGERS T. HARMSTRON, 
MARION EUGENE HARMSTON, 
HELENE G. GILLIS AND CARL 
FREDERICK HARMSTON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
J. H. CALDER, as the Administrator 
of the Estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston, Deceased, 
Defendant ,and Respondent. 
CASE 
1 No. 73'62 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT 
At th·e outset we direct the attention of the court to 
the fact that on the cover page and again on page 1 of 
the brief filed on behalf of Roger T. Harms ton, et al, 
it is designated as ''Brief of Respondents''. This brief 
is filed on behalf of J. H. Calder, who disclaims all 
responsibility for what is sraid in the brief filed by Roger 
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2 
T. Harms ton, et al, and he shall characterize himself 
as the respondent, which in fact he is. 
MOTION TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT BECAUSE 
THE STATEMENT OF ERRORS IS 
FATALLY D·E:FECTIVE. 
Comes now the respondent, J. H. Calder, and moves 
the court to either dismiss the ·appeal or affirm the 
judgment and decree appealed from for the reason and 
upon the grounds that the brief filed by the appellants 
is not in conformity with Rule 8 of this court and the 
statement of errors contained in said brief of appellants 
is so general and uncertain in that such statement does 
not specify what p.articular ·errors are relied upon by 
appellants for a reversal of the judgment or decree 
'appealed from. On the contrary the statement of errors 
in effect merely states that such decree or judgment is 
wrong and against law. 
This motion is made upon the statement of errors 
contained ·on page 31 and repeated on page 32 of the 
brief filed on behalf of Roger T. Harmston, et al. 
It has repeatedly been held by this court that it is 
without jurisdiction to review ;a cause appealed from a 
lower court in the absence of assignments of error. 
Smith Table Co., vs. Madsen, 30 Ut. 297; 84 Pac. 885. 
Lyon vs. Mauss, 31 Utah 283; 87 Pac. 1014. So also has 
it been repeatedly held by this court that an assignment 
of errors which does not advise the court with p·articu-
larity the error relied upon for a reversal of a judgment 
or decree is fa tally defective and the court will affirm 
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the judgment unless the error or errors relied upon .are 
specified with particularity. Bauwhuis, et al, vs. John-
son, ·68 Utah 544; 251 Pac. 359 where numerous cases 
from this jurisdiction are cited. A general discussion 
of the functions and requirements of assignments of 
errors "\Yill be found discussed 'at length in 4 C.J.S., page 
1770 where it is said that: 
''An assignment of error must be sufficient 
to point out in what particular respect the action 
complained of was erroneous and the grounds 
or reasons for the contention unless the error is 
manifest and it must not be vague and general 
in this respect. '' 
To the same effect see 3 Am. Jur., page 293, Sec. 70/3 
where it is said : 
''An assignment of errors must be specific. 
A general assignment without specification of the 
particular point relied on gives no information 
to the -appellate court or to the adverse party 
and will not as a general rule be considered. The 
assignment should point out the place in the 
record where the incidents complained of may 
be found." 
Cases will be found cited from various state and 
federal courts 1n support of and which do support 
the text. 
It will be observed that assignments 1, 3, 4, 5 ~and 
6 on page 31 of the Harmston brief, some of which are 
repeated on page 32 of the brief, merely state that 
certain orders, findings of fact, conclusions of la"\v and 
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judgment are not supported by the law. Just what is 
meant by such claimed errors it is impossible to ascer-
t~ain from the assignments. Is it claimed that the find-
ings of fact are contrary to law and if so which of the 
findings of fact, if any, are contrary to law~ If a found 
fact is established by evidence it cannot be contrary to 
law. So also if conclusions of law find support in the 
facts found the same may not be s1aid to be contrary 
to law. 
In assignment numbered 2 it is said the uncontra-
dicted evidence does not support the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law or the judgment entered herein on 
the 3rd day of January, 1949. We do not understand 
that uncontradicted evidence is required to support 
findings of fact, conclusions of law or judgment. Many, 
if not most, findings of fact 1are upheld when there is 
a conflict in the evidence. 
In ~a broad sense it may doubtless be said that 
every judgment is contrary to law where prejudicial 
error was committed at the trial. Thus to say that a 
judgment is contrary to law totally £ails to inform the 
court :or counsel wherein the judgment is contrary to 
law. Nor does the statement of errors advise the court 
or counsel wherein or what findings and conclusions 
appellants claim is or are contrary to law. 
As to assignment number 5 there is nothing to indi-
cate wherein the court erred in denying appellants' 
motion for 'a new trial. If appellants cannot prevail 
because of some deemed error not properly assigned 
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it follows that they eannot prevail because the court· 
denied a ne'Y trial. It is not error to deny a new trial 
in the absence of some prejudicial error having occurred 
at the trial. 
If assignments of error are to serve any useful pur-
poses, as the courts uniformly hold they do, then ~and 
in such case the statement of errors in appellants' brief 
totally fail to serve such purpose. 
It will also be observed that the record filed in this 
cas·e is somewhat lengthy and notw,.ithstanding such fact 
the statement of errors does not refer to where in the 
reeord the claimed errors may be found. 
It is submitted that the judgment should be affirmed 
because there are no sufficient assignment or statement 
of errors made on behalf of the appellants. 
ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF CASE 
If the above motion is granted, as we contend it 
should be, then and in such case that of course will 
end this controversy. In the event the court should 
conclude otherwise we direct the attention of the court 
to some additional facts which we deem material to con-
sider in reviewing the record in this case. 
In order to enable the court to find the place in 
the record where there may he found the p~arts thereof 
which we refer to it will be ·observed that the numbering 
of the pages begins with what is designated as the bill 
of exceptions. The pages of that part of the record 
are numbered consecutively, and then the probate files 
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In the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston, beginning 
with page 205 are numbered consecutively. We shall 
refer to such pages in the course of this brief. 
After the death of Isabelle Thurston Harmf;'ton, the 
administratrix of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston, 
J. H. ·Calder was in April, 1938 appointed administrator 
de bonis non of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston. 
(R. 349) He furnished the bond fixed by the court and 
on April 30th, 1938 letters of administration were issued 
to J. H. Calder. (R. 350) The petition for letters of 
~administration was filed by the Farmers and Merchants 
Bank, a corporation, which held a note signed by Isabelle 
T. Harmston and Isabelle T. Harmston, administratrix 
of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston. The note 
was secured by a mortgage on Lots 29, 30, 31 and 32, 
Block 9, Plat ''A'' Roosevelt Townsite, Duchesne County, 
Utah. The mortgage was executed by Isabelle Harmston 
individually and as administratrix of the ·estate of 
Marion Eugene Harmston. The findings of fact and con-
clusions of law and decree of foreclosure are set out in 
the record, pages 97 to 116. The property covered by 
the mortgag·e was sold to. satisfy the amount owing 
on the note and mort~a.ge. (R. 302) 
At the time the note and mortgage were executed 
the real property covered by the mortgage on July 31, 
1937 (R. 89) was a part of the estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston. (R. 323) The inventory and appraisement 
filed by Isabelle Harmston and decree of partial distri-
bution Wla.s entered on August 30, 1937 by which decree 
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of distribution the property 'vas decreed to Isabelle 
Thurston Harmston. (R. 340) 
T'he money that 'vas loaned to Isabelle Fiarmston 
individually and as administratrix of the estate was 
used to construct a service station on the property 
mortgaged ta.nd which p·roperty stood in the na1ne of 
Marion Eugene Harmston at the time the money was 
so loaned. (Tr. 51-52) 
The rents and profits derived from the property 
were collected by Roger T. Harmston. (R. 74) 
During the time that Isabelle T. Harmston was 
administratrix of the estate of Marion Eugene Harmston 
the property was sold for taxes and bought in by MJ-s. 
Harmston for the sum of $510.52. (R. 39) The property 
was again sold for taxes in 1936 and an auditor's tax 
deed issued in May, 1941 to Charles W. Jenkins for 
$459.87. On October 18, 1941 Charles W. Jenkins and 
wife conveyed the property to Roger Harmston, one of 
the plaintiffs herein, for the sum of $53_5.77. (R. 40) 
It will thus be seen that when J. H. Calder was 
appointed administrator of the estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston there w~re taxes owing and the prop·erty had 
been sold because of the failure to pay the same. 
When Calder learned that taxes were owing upon 
Lots 5 to 12 of the property belonging to the estate he 
was without any funds belonging to the estate to pay 
the same (R. 23), and so informed Roger Harmston, 
one of the heirs and a plaintiff herein who promised 
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to pay such delinquent taxes and thus redeem it for · · · 
the heirs. ( R. 49) 
After Isabelle H1armston was appointed administra-
trix of her deceased husband's, Marion Eugene Harms ton 
Estate and on June 19, 1922 (R. 312) she, on June 
14, 1926, filed an inventory and appraisement of the 
estate. (R. 273) She listed Lots 29, 30, 31 and 32, which 
'\Vere later distributed to her, also Lots 8, 9 and 10, 
Block 32, and Lots from 5 to 12, $200.00 cash; three 
cows 1and one calf and a half interest in 300 shares and 
10 shares of stock in the Texas Standard Oil Company 
of the value of $150.00 as constituting the assets of 
the estate. ( R. 323) 
• After Calder was appointed administrator of the 
estate of Marion Eugene Harmston he caused 1an inven-
tory and reappraisement of the estate to be made and 
filed. He listed Lots 29, 30, 31 and 32 but the same 
were not appraised. He listed Lots 5 to 12 and the 
same were appraised at $1500.00. Lots 8, 9 arid 10 
were listed and appraised at $900.00. 
The ·stock in the T·exas Standard Oil Company was 
also listed but no value placed thereon. The ap:praise-
ment is dated Sept. 9, 1939 tand was filed in court on 
Sept. 26, 1939. The total value of the estate was placed 
at $2400.00 (R. 373) 
Mr. Calder secur·ed an order authorizing him to sell 
Lots 8, 9 and 10 under date of March 6, 1939. (R. 359) 
On September 25, 1939 the court approved the sale of 
Lots 8, 9 and 10 to Harry W. Larson for the sum of 
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$1000.00, of "\Yhich $150.00 'Yas C'nsh and the ren1ainder 
"\Yas to be paid at $12.50 per month with interest on the 
unpaid portion at 6% per annum until the "~hole amount 
\\~as p·aid. (R. 375) Larson defaulted in his payments 
and Calder conveyed the property to Charles W. 
Jenkins, subject to the rights of Larson, the original 
purchaser. (R. 11) Larson paid a total of $297.50 
before he defaulted. Jenkins agreed to pay and did 
pay $1075.00 principal and $142.50 interest. (R. 12) The 
estate thus realized $1539.00 from the sale of the prop-
. erty which was the amount reported in the account 
of Calder. ( R. 391) 
On April 19, 1940 Roger T. Harms ton, one of the 
heirs, filed a petition to revoke the letters of administra-
tion to J. H. C1alder in which p·etition it is, among other 
rna tters, in substance alleged: 
"That J. H. Calder was 1appointed administrator of 
the estate on July 28, 1938 and letters of administration 
issued to him. That said J. H. Calder is not entitled 
to said administration without the consent of the heirs.'' 
"That the said heirs of said deceased have heretofore 
given their consent to said administration but that this 
petitioner alleges that during the past year or two 
it has been unnecessary, expensive and inconvenient to 
administer said estate with the administrator and his 
attorney both residing at Provo, Utah.'' The petition 
was signed and verified by Roger T. Harmston and was 
also signed by Merril H. Larsen, attorney for the peti-
tioner. (R. 377) 
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To the petition the attorney for c~alder filed It 
demurrer. (R. 382) 
On June 3, 1940 Judge Young ordered the revoca-
tion of letters of administration to Calder and that 
letters issue to a person claiming under prior rights. 
The court further ordered the payment of all proper 
charges and directed the administrator to file a report. 
(R. 384) On September 4, 1940 a similar order was made 
and Roger T. Harmston was ordered appointed admin-
istrator, his bond was fixed at $500.00 if a surety bond 
and $800.00 if a personal bond. (R. 385) The orders 
above mentioned appear in the minute entries. So far 
as appears no formal written order was ever made. 
Also so far as appears Roger T. Harmston never took 
an oath of office and no letters of administration were 
ever issued to him. He did file a bond which was never 
ap:proved. ( R. 386) 
So far as the probate files show no further proceed-
ings were had until August 30, 1947 when Calder filed 
a final account and petition for distribution. (R. 387-391) 
Also (R. 444 to 448). 
After the hearing was had and the account approved 
Calder paid to eounsel for the plaintiffs the sum of 
$1018.51 as ordered by the court (R. 480) and Calder was 
discharg.ed and his sureties released from all liability. 
(R. 481) 
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CROSS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Comes now the respondent 'and makes the following 
cross assignments of error: 
1. The trial court erred in admitting the files in 
cause numbered 1931 civil. (R. 28 and 29) 
2. The trial eourt erred in admitting in evidence 
the files in cause numbered 1932 civil. (R. 28 and 29) 
3. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence 
over respondent's objection the files in the probate pro-
ceedings in the matter of the Estate of Isabelle T. 
Harmston, the same being probate file 374. (R. 28 and 29) 
4. The tri,al court erred in rejecting evidence that 
Calder prepared a report and account and mailed it to 
~lerril Larsen, attorney for Roger T. Harmston. (R. 76) 
ARGUMENT 
As to the cross assignments of error it may be 
that respondent has not been prejudiced. We are at a 
loss, however, to see the materiality of the mortgage 
foreclosure proceedings had in case number 1931, the 
same being the action to recover on a note and foreclose 
a mortgage for $2500.00 executed by Isabelle T. Harm-
ston as an individual. The fact that Is1abelle T. Harmston 
gave a note and a mortgage or the proceedings had to 
foreclose the same could not have any bearing on the 
question of whether or not J. H. Calder properly admin-
istered the estate of Marion Eugene H1armston. So also 
and for the same reason the proceedings had in the 
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rna tter of the estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton are in no 
way material to any controversy involved in this pro-
ceeding. It will be noted that there are about 200 pages 
of the Bill of Exceptions devoted to ta copy of such 
proceedings. Unless the attention of the court is directed 
to such matter it might well be confusing to the court 
as it has to the writers of this brief. Nor are the files 
in cause numbered 1932 civil enlightening, except pos-
sibly to show that the property foreclosed was owned 
by Marion Eugene Harmston at ·the time the $4500.00 
note and mortgage were executed, a fact which is not 
disputed, and is established beyond controversy by the 
probate files in the Marion Eugene Htarmston estate. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN 
HOLDING THAT THE ONLY PROPERTY THAT 
CAME INTO POSSESSION OF J. H. CALDER 
WAS THE PROPERTY WHICH HE SOLD. 
Beginning on page 32 of appellants' brief it is 
argued that property other than Lots 8, 9 and 10 came 
in to the possession of Calder. It is true that Calder 
listed in his inventory other property, namely: Lots 3 
to 12, which were appraised at $1500.00 but the evidence 
conclusively shows that he never had tactual possession of 
such property. That property stood in the name of 
Isabelle Harmston, the widow of the deceased, by reason 
of her having received an auditor's tax deed. She paid 
$510.52 to Duchesne County for the property. (R. 39) 
Calder was wholly without funds to pay the taxes which 
had been paid by Mrs. H1armston, the mother of all 
of the heirs who are here complaining. If Cald~r had 
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brought suit against the n1other of the· heirs to recover 
the property and charged the expenses against the estate 
of Marion Eugene Harmston we "\Yonder 'vhat the court 
and those interested in the estate 'vould have s1a.id about 
such useless expenditure of the assets of the estate, 
especially so in light of the fact that it could make no 
difference to the persons interested in the estate 
after the death of Isabelle Harmston as to whether their 
father or mother held the title to the property. The 
evidence further shows that Calder never collected any 
of the rents or profits from such property (R. 8) On 
the contrary Roger T. Harmston had possession of that 
property and collected the rents therefrom after the Utah 
Savings and Trust Company ceased to act as adminis-
trator of the Isabelle Harmston estate. (R. 29 and 37) 
The estate of Isabelle T. Harmston claimed th1at prop-
erty and in the inventory and appraisement -of Isabelle 
T. Harmston's estate, the Utah Savings and Trust 
Company reported the same as a part of that estate. 
(R. 491) That company collected the rents and profits 
therefrom up to the time it was relieved as adminis-
trator. It should further be noted that under date of 
April 15, 1940 Roger T. Harmston prepared a petition 
to have the Utah Stavings and Trust Company removed 
as administrator of the Isabelle Harmston estate and 
have himself app;ointed. (R. 226 to 228) Roger T. 
Harmston was appointed administrator of the estate of 
Isabelle T. H1armston to succeed the Utah Savings and 
Trust Company by an order made on December 4, 1940. 
(R. 248-251) He furnished a bond which is dated Feb. 
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29, 1941 from which time he collected the rents on Lots 
5 to 12. Thus the only evidence which tends to show 
that Calder ever had possession of Lots 5 to 12 is that 
said lots are listed in the inventory. The evidence as 
above indicated is that Calder never collected one cent 
of the rents or profits but the same were collected by 
the administ:r'~ators of the estate of Isabelle T. Harms ton 
and that such administrators claimed the property fo~ 
said estate. It is axiomatic that the law does not require 
the doing of a useless thing. It may be inquired what 
useful purpose would be served by Calder bringing an 
action to recover title to Lots 5 to 12. Where could he 
get the money to prosecute such an 'action unless he 
advanced it himself~ If he had succeeded in recovering 
the property it would be distributed to the same persons 
who will receive it if it comes through the estate of the 
mother, Isabelle T. Harmston. 
Possession of property means, as we understand it, 
more than to list property in an inventory. The evidence 
shows that the title to Lots 5 to 12 stands in the name 
of Roger T. Harmston who purchased it for the use of 
the heirs. 
As to the stock in the Texas Standard Oil Company 
the evidence shows that Calder had never received any 
such certificate and from correspondence he learned that 
the company was defunct. (R. 10) He made inquiry 
about the $200.00 reported by Mrs. Harmston as being 
in the hank but there was no such money nor could be 
found any cows or calves belonging to the estate. (R. 9) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
There is no evidence 1 o refute the testiinony of Calder. 
If there 'vas any stock of value belonging to the estate 
of Harmston it is more than likely that some of the 
children 'vould know about its existence. Calder having 
attempted to locate such stock and having learned that 
the company had ceased to exist there was nothing more 
he could do. 
Complaint is made because Calder sold the prop-
erty to Larson and subsequently sold to Jenkins. At the 
time the sale was made to Jenkins in 1942 it was not 
necessary for an administrator to secure the consent 
of the court to sell real estate. Chapter 113, page 154, 
Laws of Utah 1939, now U.C.A. 1943, 102-10-5. ·It will 
be noted from the contract of sale ''Protestants' Exhibit 
1" that the sale was made subject to confirmation by 
the court having jurisdiction of the estate of Marion 
Eugene Harmston, deceased, and also subject to the 
rights of Harry W. Larson. It will further be noted 
that C1alder received $1539.00 in principal and interest 
for the property, (R. 9) while the property was ap-
praised at only $900.00. The last payment made by 
Jenkins was on February 2, 1946 as shown by the re·:port 
filed on August 30, 1947. (R. 391) Pursuant to an order 
to show cause another report was made on August 30, 
1948. (R. 444) 
Counsel for the plaintiffs has been paid the money 
derived from the sale of the property and given his 
receipt therefor (R. 480). It is stated on page 29 of 
appellant ''s brief that it might not be amiss to here state 
that there is now an action pending to recover back the 
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property (Lots 8, 9 and 10). Apparently appellants 
believe that they can have their cake and eat it too. If 
the plaintiffs believe they still have a right to the prop-
erty it is indeed difficult to see why they are conl-
plaining because we turned over to their representative 
the proceeds from the sale of the property, less certain 
items of expense. If as app·ellants contend they are 
still the owners of the property which Calder sold and 
their representative has the money derived from the 
sale of said property then 1and in such case it is difficult 
for us to understand why appellants are here complain-
ing because Calder sold the property to Jenkins with a 
provision in such contract to the effect that Jenkins 
should take the p·roperty subject to the rights of Larson. 
It is further said on page 34 of appellants' brief 
that C1alder failed to secure the confirmation of the sale 
of the property to Jenkins and that it does not appear 
that Calder had the ability to dispossess Larson. We 
can understand how there might be some controversy 
between Larson and Jenkins as to their respective 
rights to the property sold, but they are, as it so ap-
pears, s1atisfied with what was done and the rep·resenta-
tives of the plaintiffs having received the money derived 
from the sale are in no way injured by any defect in 
the ti tie of Jenkins. Indeed they are benefited by the 
manner in which Calder disposed of the property. If 
Calder had become involved in litigation with Larson 
in an effort to dispossess Larson such a proceeding 
would obviously cost the estate a substantial sum which 
would be taken out of the assets of the estate. 
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The generally accepted Yiew is that the conveyance 
of property authorized to be sold may be made to the 
assignee of the purchaser or to such person as the pur-
chaser may indicate. Eu·ing vs. H'igby, 7 Ohio 198; 28 
Am. D. 248; McKee vs. Simpson, 36 F. 248; Hallick vs. 
Grey, 9 C1al. 18; 70 Am. D. 643; Hobson vs. Ewan, 62 Ill. 
146; White vs. Jones, 88 N.C. 166; West vs. Burgie, 75 
Ark. 516; 88 S.W. 557; Pruit vs .. Holly, 73 Ala. 269. 
While the evidence in this case does not show that 
Jenkins had any arrangements with Larson it is a 
reasonable inference that he had some understanding 
"~th Larson as otherwise Jenkins would not have under-
taken to purchase the property. 
nioreover the representatives of the appellants 
having accepted and retained the money derived from 
the sale of the property they are now estopped from 
questioning the validity of the sale. Warner vs. Hill, 
153 Fa. 510; 112 S.E. 478; Allen vs. Bekmier (Tex.) Civ. 
App. 216 S.W. 647; Gilbert vs. Ho'([J1kins, 204 Fed. 196, 
122 C.C.A. 482; Myers vs. Boyd, 144 Ind. 496; 43 N.E. 
567; Powers vs. Scharling, 76 Kans. 855; 92 Pac. 1099; 
Estrade vs. K aack, 126 La. 26; 52 S. 181; ~willie vs. 
Brooks, 45 Miss. 542; Meddes vs. Kenney, 176 Mo. 200; 
75 S.W. 633; Mote vs. Kleen, 83 Neb. 585; 119 N.W. 
1125; Matten vs .. Brown, 141 N.Y.S. 318; Browne vs. 
Coleman, 62 Ore. 454, 125 P. 278. 
So 1also do the authorities hold that before a sale 
may be vacated it is necessary to offer or tender back 
the money paid before the sale may be set aside. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lS 
34 C .. J.S., page 611, Sec. 630 and ~4 ,Q.J., I[Jiage 680 and 
cases cited in footnotes. 
So also a sale made by an executor or administra-
tor is barred by the statutes of limitation after three 
years. U.·G.A. 1943, 104-2-17. 
The attention of the court is also directed to U.C.A. 
1943, 102-10-6 which gives any person interested in an 
estate the right to bring an action for the neglect or 
misconduct of a personal representative in making a 
sale of property if the person complaining has sustained 
damage by reason thereof. No claim is here made that 
the heirs have sustained any damage by reason of the 
sale to Jenkins even if it be held, cont~ary to our con-
tention, that such sale was improvidently made. The 
evidence shows that the p·roperty was depreciating 1n 
value at the time the sale was made (R. 22). 
J. H. CALD·ER WAS PROPERLY APPOINTED 
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF 
MARION EUGENE HARMSTON. 
It is contended at some length in appellants' brief 
that Calder was not properly 'appointed administrator 
of the estate. No such claim was made by any of the 
appellants until on October 15, 1947 when Roger T. 
Harmston filed his amended petition seeking the revo-
cation of the letters of administration issued to Calder 
on May 28, 1938 (R. 402 to 408). 
Roger T. Harmston did file a petition to h'ave 
Calder's letters revoked in 1938, because, as therein al-
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leged: ''The said heirs of said deceased have hereto-
fore given their consent to such administration but that 
this petitioner alleges that during the past year or two 
it has been unnecessarily expensive 'and inconvenient 
to administer said estate with the administrator and 
his attorney both residing at Provo, Utah" (R. 377-
378). ''Te doubt very much that the grounds alleged in 
such petition are sufficient to withstand the demurrer 
filed thereto, but no useful p·urpose would be served by 
arguing such demurrer at this late date. The court 
ordered the letters of C1alder revoked and directed that 
letters of administration issue to Roger T. Harmston 
(R. 385). ~ o formal order appears to have been made. 
On October 15, 1942 a surety bond was filed but so far 
as shown by the record no oath of office was filed and 
no letters of administration issued to Roger T. Harm-
ston. Calder prepiared an account and at the hearing he 
attempted to show that a copy of the account was sent 
to the attorney for Roger T. Harmston but the court 
rejected the evidence of the sending of such account (R. 
75 and 76). 
Some of the heirs of Marion Eugene Harmston alsa 
assisted in securing a purchaser for Lots 8, 9 and 10 
(R. 47). 
It will thus be seen that the heirs at l1aw of Harm-
ston recognized the fact that Calder was serving as 
administrator by and with their approval and consent. 
It is also made to appear from the evidence that the· 
appell,ants have waived their right to act as adminis-
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estopp·ed by their conduct from questioning the right 
of Calder to serve as administrator of said estate and 
that they have ratified his appointment. 
Moreover, as we have heretofore pointed out, Isa-
belle T. Harmston signed the note and mortgage as the 
administratrix of the estate of Marion Eugene Harm-
stan and the money which she received was used to 
improve property which was a part of that estate when 
such improvements were made. It is of course elemen-
tary that every careful lawyer who is called upon to 
foreclose a mortgage will make all parties defendants 
who have or appear to have a claim subsequent or sub-
ject to the mortgage which is about to be foreclosed. 
We are mindful that under our law an administra-
tor must as a general rule secure an order of court 
before he can mortgage the prop·erty of the estate. It 
is a well settled law that an administrator may and fre--
quently does enter into contracts or assumes obligations 
for and on behalf of the estate and later have such acts 
approved by the court. So far -as we are advised the 
courts uniformly approve such acts if they are for the 
benefit of the estate. In this case there can be no serious 
question but that the improvements of the property 
belonging to the estate was calculated to be beneficial to 
the estate. It was by such means that the estate could 
derive .an income from its otherwise unimpr?ved prop-
erty. It is true that prior to the foreclosure of the 
mortgage the mortgaged property was distributed to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
Isabelle T. Harmston but it does not necessarily follow 
from such fact that the money loaned for the imp·rovc-
ment of the property of the estate was not a benefit to 
the estate. If l\Irs. Harmston had lived or if the mort-
gage on the property giYen to secure the money loaned 
to improve the property had been paid who can say 
that the probate court may not have required the estate 
to pay some or all of the money borrowed upon the final 
distribution of the estate. The fact that Mrs. Harmston 
signed the note and mortgage as administratrix of the 
estate of her deceased husband was notice to the Farm-
ers and l\Ierchants Bank that in the mind of Mrs. Harm-
ston the estate was under some obligation to pay the 
note. The Bank in its foreclosure proceeding was in no 
position to claim that the estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston had no interest in the p.roperty covered by 
the mortgage .and no obligation to pay a part or all of 
the note signed by Mrs. Harmston, as administratrix 
of her husband's estate. 
The only safe way of setting that matter at rest 
was to have an administrator of the estate appointed 
and made a party to the foreclosure proceedings. Ap-
parently none of the heirs at law were willing to serve 
as administrator and therefore the Bank was compelled 
to act in the matter before it could safely proceed to 
foreclose its mortgage to the end that any interest that 
the estate might have in the mortgaged property be fore-
closed and the record owner of the property be p·re-
cluded from making the claim that the estate of Marion 
Eugene Harmston had an interest in the estate by 
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reason of the property standing in the name of the de-
ceased at the time the mortgage and note were executed 
and the same were executed by the administr-atrix of 
the estate. 
In their brief appellants seem to rely on the case 
of In re: Cloward's Estate, 95 Utah 453, 82 Pac. (2d) 
336, 119 A.L.R. 123. The facts of that case are easily 
distinguishable from the facts in this case. In the Clo-
ward case some of the heirs were minors. The petition 
of G. T. Bean was filed in less than three months after 
the death of Amanda Cloward Searle. There was no 
semblance of a claim in favqr of G. T. Bean against the 
estate of Amanda Cloward Searle or against the estate 
·of Thomas H. Cloward. There is nothing in that case 
which indicates that any of the heirs at law of either 
Cloward or Mrs. Searle ever consented to or ratified 
the appointment of Bean as administrator. The Cloward 
case is not authority for the doctrine that one who 
claims to have an interest in an estate may not properly 
be appointed administrator if it later turns out that his 
claim is unenforcible. On page 344 of 82 Pac. (2d) in 
the p·revailing opinion it is said : 
"If the 1ap~pellant claims to be a creditor only 
a prima facie showing is required, but if the proof 
of this fails the petition should be dismissed.' ' 
The fact that the note and mortgage were signed by 
Isabelle T. Harmston, as administratrix of the estate 
of Marion Eugene Harmston, established a prima facie 
case of liability of the estate and the court properl~\,. 
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appointed Mr. Calder as administrator where, as here, 
no one appeared to oppose the appointment. Under the 
doctrine of unjust enrichment or quasi contracts the 
estate might 'Yell be held liable for the improvements 
placed upon the p·roperty 'Yith the money loaned by the 
bank. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON·CL USIONS OF 
h.\ W SUPPORT THE ORDER MADE 
0~ DECEMBER 21, 1948. 
Beginning on page 40 of appellants' brief under 
the heading "Point II" it is contended that various of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Trial Court are erroneous. We have already discussed 
most of the questions discussed under that heading, in-
cluding subdivisions B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K and L 
thereof. 
In support of its claim that the mortgage to the 
B,ank is invalid in so far as the estate of Mr. Harmston 
is concerned the cases of Skebata v·s. Bear R·iver State 
Bank of Utah, 205 Pac. (2d) 251 and Parks vs. Illinois 
Life Insurance Company, 176 Okla. 63, 54 Pac. (2d) 392 
ar·e cited. In the Skebata case the mortgage was to se-
cure money not for the benefit of the estate but for the 
use and benefit of a third person. No such question is 
here ·presented because the money in this case was 
loaned and used for the improvement of property which 
belonged to the estate at the time the money was loaned. 
In the Oklahoma case the court did hold that a 
mortgage of prop·erty of an estate must be authorized 
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by the proper tribunal. We do not contend that an ad-
ministrator of an estate may mortgage property for 
the benefit of a third person nor do we contend that an 
administrator may mortgage property for any purpose 
other than for the benefit of the estate. What we do 
contend is that in light of the fact that Mrs. Harmston 
signed the note and mortgage as administratrix of he:t 
husband's estate at the time the property stood in his 
name it was proper to have the .administrator of the 
estate made a p·arty to a foreclosure proceeding for the 
purpose of foreclosing a mortgage purporting to bind 
the estate and that one holding such a mortgage has 
such an interest in the estate as will .authorize the 
mortgagee to designate someone to act as administrator 
so that any interest that the estate may claim in the 
mortgaged property may be foreclosed, especially where 
the money is loaned .and used for the improvement of 
property belonging to the estate. That is all that is 
her·e claimed by the respondent. We, of course, do not 
know what arrangements, if any, Mrs. Harmston had 
with her childrei!l when she had Lots 29 to 32 distributed 
to her. So far as we know she may have continued to 
hold it in trust for the other persons interested in the 
estate. The fact remains that Mrs. Harniston signed 
the note and mortgage as administratrix of the estate 
of her deceased husband. 
It is, of course, elementary that a mortgagor is a 
necessary party defendant to a suit to foreclose .a mort-
gage. In view of the law being so well settled that 
mortgagors are necessary parties to a foreclosure p·ro-
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from the case of Ankeny v. Lieuallen, et a.l .. , 127 Pac. 
(2d) 735, 736: 
''In mortgage foreclosure cases, all mort-
gagors, if living, or, if dead, their personal repre-
sentatives, are 'proper and necesS'ary parties 
defendant', and, if not made defendants, their 
individual interest in the mortgaged property 
would not be affected by the foreclosure.'' 
Not until there was a judicial determination of the in-
terests or liability, if any, of the estate of Mr. Harmston 
in or on the note and mortgage could that matter be said 
to be set at rest. The only way that could be done was 
to have an administrator .appointed and made a party 
to the foreclosure suit. That result has been accomp-
lished. The mortgage has been foreclosed and the estate 
relieved from all liability on account of the note and 
mortgage. As we understand the appellants make no 
claim that the estate of Mr. Harmston has any interest 
in the mortgaged property and the Bank makes no claim 
that the estate is liable for any deficiency. 
In appellants' brief they further contend that the 
Bank having failed to file -a claim against the estate 
within the time allowed in the Notice to Creditors it, 
therefore, is not a creditor. There is no necessity of 
filing a claim secured by a mortgage unless the mortga-
gee seeks a deficiency judgment. U .. :C.A. 1943, 102-9-11. 
It should be noted that under the provisions of U.~C.A. 
1943, 102-4-3, letters of administration must be granted 
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to any interested applicant when the p·ersons having a 
better right fail to appear and claim letters of adminis-
tration within three months after the death of decedent. 
Obviously one claiming a lien on the property belonging 
to an estate is interested therein even though such 
person makes no claim beyond the enforcement of a lien 
against the property belonging to or in which the estate 
claims or may claim an interest in the property covered 
by the lien. 
On page 45 of appellants' brief it is said that the 
p.roperty sold to Larson was not appraised within one 
year of the sale. Counsel is in error in making that 
statement. The property sold was appraised on Septem-
ber 9th, 1939 and the sale was approved on September 
25, 1939 (R. 373-376). 
On pages 45 and 46 of appellants' brief they again 
discuss the failure of Calder to pay the taxes which 
beeame due before he was appointed as administrator 
and which p·roperty was purchased by Isabelle T. Harm-
.ston, who claimed to be the owner of such property. We 
have already directed the attention of the court to the 
fact that the heirs of Mr. and Mrs. Harmston were the 
same, that Roger T. Harmston collected the rents and 
profits derived from Lots 5 to 12; that Calder had no 
funds to pay the taxes; that Roger T. Harmston agreed 
to pay the taxes and that Rog·er T. Harmston now holds 
the legal title to the property for the use and benefit of 
the heirs. Pray how then may it be said that there is 
any loss because Rog·er T. Harmston paid the taxes or 
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"~hy Calder should be surcharged with anything for fail-
ing to do that which he was unable to do because of a 
lack of funds and which Roger T. Harms ton agreed to 
pay out of the funds which he collected and when, as 
here, no damage has resulted to the estate because Roger 
T. Harmston holds the legal title for the use and bene-
fit of the estate. As we have heretofore observed why 
should Calder have brought an action and squandered 
v.~hat little assets the estate may have had when to do 
so v.~ould have accomplished nothing of ultimate benefit 
to the estate and when Calder was entirely without funds 
of the estate to engage in such useless litigation~ 
In their brief appellants in one breath complain 
that Calder was negligent because he failed to pay the 
taxes on the p·roperty of the estate notwithstanding he 
had no funds belonging to the estate and in the next 
breath they contend that the property of the estate 
should not have been sold because there was no necessity 
to sell the same. If Mrs. Harmston's ·estate and Roger 
T. Harmston are to be repaid the money which they ad-
vanced to pay the taxes which they are entitled to have 
repaid we wonder where the money can be found to pay 
the same without selling some of the property belonging 
to the estate. 
It will be observed that in the petition for the sale 
of the property which was sold it is, among other things, 
alleged that it is the desire of all of the heirs of said de-
cedent and all persons interested herein that said 
property be sold as aforesaid and at private sale (Tr. 
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353). Such allegation finds support in the evidence (R. 
23 and 47). There is no evidence to the contrary. That 
being so the heirs are estopped from attacking the 
validity of the sale. 34 C.J.S., Sec .. 606, page 637 and 
cases cited in footnotes. 
All that is said on page 46 of appellants' brief 
applies equally to the purchase made by Roger T. 
H:armston. 
Complaint is made on pages 48 and 49 of appel-
lants' brief because Calder permitted a default to be 
entered against him in the foreclosure of Lots 29 to 32 
and because Mr. Morgan was the attorney for Calder, 
as administrator of Mr. Harmston's estate. It is irn-
possible to conceive how the estate of Mr. Harmston 
was in any way prejudiced by such facts. Appellants 
in one breath contend that the estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston had no interest in the property because before 
the mortgage was foreclosed the same was distributed 
to Mrs. H~arm·ston and in the next breath contend that 
I 
Calder should not have permitted his default to be 
entered and also that Morgan being the attorney for 
the plaintiff in the mortgag·e foreclosure could not 
represent Calder as administrator. We are mindful of 
the rule that an at1 orney may not represent adverse 
interests but we .ar·e at a loss to see how such rule is 
applicable here where the ap·pellants contend that the 
estate of Mr. Harmston had no interest in the mortgaged 
property. It may be inquired how may one be charged 
with re:presenting adverse intere:sts where, as here, it 
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is contended by appellants that there were no adverse 
interests to be represented. The facts shown by the 
evidence are that Calder, as administrator, was made 
a party defendant because it appeared from the mort-
gage that Mr. Harmston may claim some interest in 
the property because the mortgage and note were 
signed by the administratrix of his estate. 
Numerous provisions of the Probate Code of Utah 
are cited on pages 49 and 50 of appellants' brief. Of 
course the duties there imposed upon the administrator 
should be complied with and his failure to do so will 
render him liable for damages sustained on account of 
his failure to do so. The difficulty with appellants' 
position is that there is a total absence of evidence to 
sho\Y that anything that Calder did or failed to do re-
sulted in any injury to the estate of Marion Eugene 
Harmston or to those interested in his estate. On the 
contrary jf Calder had done, what appellants claim he 
should have done, in all probability all of the estate of 
Mr. Harmston would have been squandered in attorney's 
fees and court costs. 
It has been the repeated and uniform holding of 
this court that harmless error will not justify the re-
versal of a judgment. Such is the effect of U.'C.A. 1943, 
102-11-20 referre·d to by appellants. Calder has ac-
counted for the whole of the estate which has come into 
his possession at the value of the app·raisement contained 
in the inventory, together with the money which he se-
cured in excess of the appraisement as required jn 
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u. .. c.A. 1943, 102-11-21. And such proceeds have been 
delivered to and retained by the representative of the 
appellants. C.alder was not accountable for uncollectible 
debts or property, where as here, it appears that the 
$200.00 reported by Mrs. Harmston was no longer in 
the bank., the stock was valueless and doubtless the 
cows and calf had died of old age before Calder became 
:administrator. Moreover Mrs. Harmston doubtless ex-
pended much more than the value of the property which 
was evidently disposed of by her before her death in 
paying taxes on the property of the estate in the sum 
of $510.52 (R. 39). 
Complaint is als·o made because Calder delayed in 
making distribution. The facts touching that phase of 
the case .are: He was appointed on May 5, 1938 (R. 350). 
On April 22, 1940 Roger T. Harmston filed a petition 
seeking the revocation of the letters of administration 
to Calder (R. 377). On June 3, 1940 and again on Sep-
tember 4, 1940 a minute order was made appointing 
Roger T. Harmston administrator and relieving Calder. 
So far as appears no formal order was ever made in 
conformity with the minute order. On September 22nd 
Roger T. Harmston filed a bond but so far as appears 
never took the oath of office or had letters of adminis-
tration issued to him (R. 386). The last payment on 
the property which was sold was paid on February 21, 
1946. 
As soon as Calder was to have ceased acting as ad-
ministrator and Harmston was to take over Calder 
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caused to be prepared and sent to the attorney for 
Harmston a report (R. 62 and 63). When respondent 
sought to introduce the report of Calder so made by 
J. Rulon Morgan, "Tho prepared the same, the trial 
court, as we contend, erroneously rejected the same (R. 
76). 
It is pertinent to inquire what Calder could do that 
he did not do under the circumstances. By a minute 
order of the court he was required to cease acting as 
administrator and Harmston was to take over. Harm-
stan having failed to qualify he could not lawfully take 
over. Calder attempted to get Harmston to examine his 
report before filing the same but apparently Harmston 
refused or neglected to do anything about the accounts. 
It is quite apparent that Calder did not wish to serve 
as administrator if he could be relieved from serving. 
If Harmston had qualified there can be no doubt but 
that Calder would have been delighted to be relieved 
from further serving. 
The matter stood in that condition until August 30, 
1947 when Calder filed his final account and petition 
for distribution (R. 387-391). 
JUDGE NELSON WAS A JUDGE WHEN HE 
SIGNED THE ORDER DISCHARGING CALDER. 
Under appellants' Point III on page 56 of their 
brief it is stated that Judge Joseph E. Nelson was not 
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ia District Judge when he entered the order discharging 
Calder as administrator. Counsel is in error in making 
such statement. Section 6 of Article 8 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah provides that District Judges are elected 
for four years and shall hold office until the first Mon-
day in January after their election and until their suc-
cessors have qualified. If counsel had taken the trouble 
to look up the public records he would have ascertained 
that Judge Tuckett, who succeeded Judge Nelson, did 
not take his oath of office until after the 6th day of 
January, 1949. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REF·USING 
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
On page 57 of appellants' brief it is stated that the 
trial court erred in denying appellants' motion for a 
new trial. Nothing new is argued under that heading. 
When the court examines this record it will find that 
Calder has filed vouchers showing the amounts, dates 
and purposes for which he expended the moneys coming 
into his possession as administrator, including the money 
which he paid to the representative of the appellants. 
Such money is retained by the appellants and thereby 
they are estopped from attacking the judgment ap-
pealed from as we have heretofore pointed out in our 
motion to dismiss the appeal. 
Moreover even though it should be found that Calder 
has failed to strictly comply with some of the provi-
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sions of our Probate Code there is a complete failure 
of any evidence that appellants have sustained any in-
jury because of such failure. 
It is submitted that the judgment should be af-
firmed with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. RULON MORGAN 
ELIAS HANSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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